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The Principle of Fair Notice: Is it
Prudent Guidance for the Future of
Patent Law?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States patent system serves three important objectives: (1) to
reward inventors for their efforts in developing innovative technology; (2) to
encourage these inventors and others to continue to advance technology; and (3)
to disclose to the public the scope of the invention so that the public is put on
notice of that which is no longer in the public domain.' The last objective is the
principle of fair notice. Often, achieving the most economically advantageous
balance of these objectives creates tension between the patentee, who is the
inventor who has secured a patent, and the public.2 On one side are the patentees
who must be rewarded for their ingenuity and investment in order to encourage
them to create and disclose inventions.3 Construing the patentee's property rights
too narrowly turns the patent into a "hollow and useless thing" and reduces the
incentive to create and disclose.4 On the other side of the balance is the public,
which is wary of improving upon a patented invention when faced with the threat
of trespassing onto someone else's intellectual property and becoming liable for
infringement.5 Construing patents too broadly in favor of patentees increases the
threat to the public and discourages economically beneficial competitive efforts.6
Therefore, a tipping of the balance too far in either direction is harmful to the
promotion of "Science and useful Arts" which is the ultimate goal of the patent
1. See G. Andrew Barger, Comment, Lost in Cyberspace: Inventors, Computer Piracy and
"Printed Publications" Under Section 102(b) of the Patent Act, 71 U. DET. MERcYL. REV. 353, 373
(1994) (citing 1 WLtAMC. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 33 (1890)).
2. See id. at 373-74.
3. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 875 (1990).
4. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
5. See Jeff Kuehnle, Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.: Opening the
Floodgates on Nonliteral Patent Infringement Through the Doctrine of Equivalents, 48 BAYLOR L.
REV. 589, 604 (1996).
6. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 3, at 875.
system.7
This Comment explores how the Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have interpreted the United States patent statute,
which is codified in title 35 of the U.S.C., to accomplish the proper balance
between these competing interests. Section II explains in greater detail the tension
between the patentee and the principle of fair notice and how this tension relates
to defining the proper scope of a patent! Section III reviews three cases in which
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court shaped concepts which help to define
the scope of a patent.9 These cases involve both statutory and common law, with
each decision motivated by the principle of fair notice. Section IV points out
Congress's seemingly ambivalent stance on the issue of fair notice as reflected by
the Patent Marking and Notice Statute. ' This section also reviews a Federal
Circuit case in which the court strictly interpreted this Patent Marking and Notice
Statute contrary to congressional intent.1' This Comment then concludes that the
courts' increased reliance on the principle of fair notice has tipped the balance in
disfavor of the patentee and that further tipping in this direction by the courts is
inconsistent with congressional intent, which is threatening to the nation's
economic welfare. Finally, this Comment will suggest that to achieve continued
technological and economic leadership in the United States, the courts must
maintain the balance between the interests of both the patentee and the public when
attempting to solve future problems that arise in patent litigation.12
II. THE TENSION IN DEFINING PROPER PATENT SCOPE
The United States economy is dependent upon market forces. 3 As such,
incentives to private persons to produce needed goods and services are necessary. 4
The Constitution granted Congress the power to create laws to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '"'5
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 151 (1989) ("Moreover, the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and
technologies into the public domain through disclosure.").
8. See infra text accompanying notes 13-5 1.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 52-227. The cases discussedinclude Markman v. Westview
Instruments, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v.
Prince Manufacturing, Inc., 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996), and Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
10. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 287 (West Supp. 1998); infra text accompanying notes 234-55.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 256-95. The case discussed in this section is Amsted
Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 296-303.
13. See John W. Schlicher, If Economic Welfare Is the Goal, Will Economic Analysis Redefine
Patent Law?, 4 No. 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 12, 12 (1992).
14. See id.
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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From this grant,.the United States patent system has evolved to provide incentives
to produce technological advancement, without which our economy would
flounder.
16
The scope of a patent defines its economic significance. 7 The scope of a
patent is decided every day by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) when it
determines the admissibility of claims and by the courts when they determine
infringement liability.' Despite the important economic effects of defining patent
scope, many of the considerations that define it are discretionary. 9
Recently, the courts have made several decisions defining the scope narrowly,
the economic effects of which may be significant.20 Recent judicial decisions
affecting patent scope are consistent with the historic development of other patent
laws-they have developed without consideration of economic impact.2' However,
patent laws exist to improve the economy, and it is suggested that future changes to
the patent system should involve greater consideration of economic efficiency.2
Therefore, an issue exists as to whether recent decisions defining the scope narrowly
are consistent with economic considerations. According to at least one economist,
they are not. 23 He proposes that one effect of the new role of economics in
developing patent law will be less concern over the harm to public notice that results
from broader patent rights.24 In other words, when patent laws are framed in terms
of greater economic efficiency, greater preservation of the rights of patentees will
result.25 Examining this issue using a property rights model will help the reader to
16. See Schlicher, supra note 13, at 12.
17. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 3, at 839.
18. See id. at 840-41.
19. See id. at 839-40.
20. See generally Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc. 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17
(1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996);
Amsted Indus. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1994); infra text accompanying
notes 51-106.
21. See Schlicher, supra note 13, at 12.
22. See id. at 12-13.
23. See id. at 14, 18.
24. See id. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (suggesting that broader claims are more beneficial economically) [hereinafter
Nature and Function of Patent]; Edmund W. Kitch, The Japanese Patent System and U.S. Innovators,
29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 177, 183-84 (1997) (pointing out that the Japanese system, which
generally construes claims more narrowly than the U.S. system, has worked well for Japan).
25. See Schlicher, supra note 13, at 18.
better understand these ideas.26
A. The Property Rights Model
Using the property rights model, intellectual property may be conceptualized
much like real property, except that theoretically there is an infinite amount of it.
Patentees are much like explorers, finding and staking out new claims 7 and
investing energy and money in their exploration. 8 Once a patentee makes a
discovery, the patentee stakes a claim by disclosing it to the public and is rewarded
with a twenty year monopoly over the property. 29 During the twenty years, nobody
else can trespass onto the patentee's intellectual property without the patentee's
permission.3 ° Permission is usually achieved by negotiating a licensing contract
with the patentee." Whoever trespasses without a license from the patentee runs the
risk of being sued for infringement which can have serious consequences.32
However, after twenty years the public is free to exploit that intellectual property.33
This twenty year limit is necessary to put a cap on the amount of resources the
patentee receives as a reward for her invention.34 The problem the public faces is
knowing where the boundaries of the patentee's intellectual property lie during the
26. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW § 3, at 36-37 (3d ed. 1986) (using the
property rights model to explain how the patent system and economics relate). There are many other
useful models of patent law; however, the author feels that the property rights model is most easily
conceptualized and best serves the purposes of this Comment. See generally Nature and Function of
Patent, supra note 24 (discussing the prospect and reward theories of patent law and analogizing
patents to mining claims); Merges & Nelson, supra note 3 (discussing Kitch's prospect model as well
as others and whether broad patent scope is beneficial economically); Schlicher, supra note 13
(discussing the property, monopoly, and quid quo pro theories of patent law and predicting that
economic analysis may improve patent laws).
27. See generally Nature of Function of Patent, supra note 24 (discussing the prospect and
reward theories of patent law and analogizing patents to mining claims).
28. See Barger, supra note 1, at 373 (stating that one of the objectives of the patent privilege is
to "reward[] the inventor for his skill and labor in conceiving and perfecting his invention").
29. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a) (2) (West Supp. 1998); Barger, supra note 1, at 373-74.
30. See id.
31. See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 669 (1969) (involving an inventor who brought an
infringement suit against a patent licensee for an alleged breach of a patent licensing agreement).
32. See id.
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151
(1989).
34. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 147-48; POSNER, supra note 26, at 36. Under the reward theory
of patent law, a perpetual term for patents would seem to be appropriate. See Nature and Function of
Patent, supra note 24, at 284-85. However, using his prospect theory, Kitch suggests that a patent
should only be a reward for the value of being first. See id. Because eventually somebody else would
have discovered the technology if the patentee had not discovered it and patented it first, the value of
being first is not significant enough to warrant a perpetual monopoly over the technology as a reward.
See id. In essence, the patent is not a reward to the patentee in exchange for the technology, but rather
a reward for being the first to discover the technology. See id.
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twenty year monopoly, so it can be sure not to step over the line.35 In many
respects, it is a harsh world for the unwary, for the law allows, and even encourages,
the public to get as close to the line as it can without stepping over.36 The right to
design around a patent, or in other words to make a product similar to the patentee's
but just different enough not to infringe, is absolute.3 7 Thus, if an inventor can
succeed in doing so without infringing someone else's patent, the PTO rewards that
inventor with an "improvement" patent.38 This often means cheaper products for
consumers, which in turn furthers the "important public interest in permitting full
and free competition in the use of ideas. 3 9 But explorer beware-liability for
infringement requires no intent to infringe.4° One who accidentally trespasses onto
claimed patent territory is as liable as the willful pirate.4 ' The primary demarcation
of the boundaries of a patentee's property is the claims section of the patent.42 In
theory, the public can quickly turn to the claims section of the patent and know
exactly what is off limits.43 The claims can be best conceptualized as a verbal fence
around the patentee's property." The patent statute requires that the claims, which
are usually one or two very long sentences, "particularly point[] out and distinctly
35. See Paul M. Janicke, The Crisis in Patent Coverage: Defining Scope of an Invention by
Function, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 155 (1994).
36. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (1996) (holding that the patent
specifications are dispositive in determining the meaning of dispute terms); Daretia M.U. Schuler,
Comment, Litigation, the Doctrine of Equivalents and the Fatal Flaw: Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co. Fails and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co. Flounders
Because of the PriorArt Limitation, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 453, 475 & n.169 (1997).
37. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 ("[lmitation and refinement through imitation are both
necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy."); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
1583 ("[C]ompetitors are entitled to... design around the claimed invention.").
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
39. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969); see also State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that designing around "is the stuff of which
competition is made and is supposed to benefit the consumer"); Merges & Nelson, supra note 3, at 875-
77 ("[O]verly broad rights will preempt too many competitive development efforts.... Given the way
humans and organizations think and behave, we believe we are much better off with considerable rivalry
in invention than with too little.... [W]here technical advance has been rapid there almost always has
been considerable rivalry.").
40. See Wamer-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
41. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir.
1995), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). However, bad faith or willfulness by the infringer may increase the
award of damages ifa finding of infringement is found. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-85 (1988); Hilton Davis,
62 F.3d at 1523. i
42. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967,979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
43. See id.
44. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 37; Merges & Nelson, supra note 3, at 845.
claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. '45 To further
guard against innocent infringement by a member of the public, each patent must
also contain a specification which "shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains .. .to make and use the same., 46 If language were not so inherently
ambiguous, the public ought to feel fairly well protected by these provisions, for a
clear public record would exist to define the scope of the patentee's property and the
world would know not to tread beyond the line.47 Moreover, the economic gains of
clear patent scope would be wonderful:4 inventors could embark on scientific
explorations without fear of infringement accusations, and economic inefficiency
created by duplicative technological investments would be reduced. 49 But language
is ambiguous, and patentees are prone to mistakes of omission and overbreadth
when staking their claims.5" The reality is that a large debate has arisen over
whether to err on the side of the patentee or the accused infringer when deciding
where the patentee's intellectual property ends.5t In other words, what is the proper
scope of the patent?
The following section reviews the courts' recent attempts to address this
troubling question, and three cases stand out. Unfortunately, in all three cases, the
court relied on the principle of fair notice to reach a decision unfavorable to the
position of the patentee.
I. CASES DEFINING PATENT SCOPE THROUGH RELIANCE ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF FAIR NOTICE
A. Markman v. Westview Instruments:52 Guidance on Claim Construction
Just Where It Was Needed Least
If one imagines that the public is floating above a field of intellectual property,
then claim construction can be thought of as the process of focusing binoculars in
order to see exactly where the verbal fence (claims) of the patentee's property is.
In other words, claim construction is fine tuning the words of the claims. In an
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). For an example of a portion of a claim, see infra note 94.
46. See35U.S.C.§ 112.
47. See Jonathan A. Platt, Protecting Reliance on the Patent System: The Economics and Equities
ofIntervening Rights, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (1997) (discussing the effects of misleading
statements in the original patent on reissued and re-examined patents).
48. See id.
49. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 3, at 870-71.
50. See Platt, supra note 47, at 1031-32.
51. See Janicke, supra note 35, at 155.
52. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aft'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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infringement suit, the patentee will always want the claims to be construed broadly,
so that the patentee's patent encompasses as much as possible.53 If the court
construes the claims broadly enough, the defendant's actions will fall within the line
of infringement. On the other hand, the accused infringer will always argue the
opposite-that the claims should be construed very narrowly, so that the accused
infringer's product does not fall within the claims.54 In other words, the accused
infringer's product is not the same as the product disclosed by the claims of the
plaintiff's patent.55  In Markman, the court set forth "a strict approach to this
process.56
1. Claim Construction Is a Matter of Law
The court in Markman made it clear that claim construction is a matter of law.57
The judge decides the meaning of the claims and then instructs the jury of this
meaning." The jury is left with only the tasks of comparing the judicial construc-
tion of the claims to the infringing device and deciding if there is overlap.59 In
Markman, the court described two rationales in concluding that claim construction
is a matter of law.6° First, it adopted the view that a patent is analogous to a fully
integrated written instrument because the patent must contain a description of such
specificity as to enable someone to make and use the invention. 61 Because it is well
established that interpretation and construction of written instruments is exclusively
a matter for the judge,62 the court reasoned that necessarily construction of patent
claims is too.63 Secondly, the court reasoned that leaving claim construction to
judges would lead to more consistent construction, allowing the public to better
predict whether their actions would fall within the scope of the patentee's claims.'
53. See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see
also infra discussion accompanying notes 92-99.
54. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1580-81; see also infra discussion accompanying notes
92-99.
55. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (1996).
56. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. (citing Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. 180, 186 (1805)).
63. See id.
64. See id. at 978-79.
Further, it is only fair (and statutorily required) that competitors be able to ascertain
to a reasonable degree the scope of the patentee's right to exclude .... Moreover,
competitors should be able to rest assured, if infringement litigation occurs, that a
judge, trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the patent and its associated
public record and apply the established rules of construction, and in that way arrive
at the true and consistent scope of the patent owner's rights to be given legal effect.65
The court also reasoned that confining claim construction to the court would
benefit patentees as well.' If claim construction were a factual issue, the jury's
interpretation of the claims would carry greater weight on appeal and subject the
patentee to the danger of being bound forever by a "false interpretation.' 67 With its
new status as a matter of law, claim construction became reviewable by a de novo
standard of review on appeal, making it easier for the patentee to escape the
consequences of false interpretation by the lower court.68 Unfortunately, the
pendulum swings both ways. A recent in-depth study on post-Markman claim
construction showed a high rate of reversal based on judges' interpretations, and it
is questionable whether the Markman decision has in fact brought sunnier
conditions for patentees. 69
2. The Hierarchy of Terms
After deciding that claim construction is a matter of law, the court gave very
specific instructions to judges regarding the information they may use in doing so.7°
A judge should look to the claims first.7 If the proper scope of the patent is not
clear from the claims alone, the judge may next look to the specification for
clarification.72 If the judge is still unsure as to the proper construction, the judge
may then look to the prosecution history of the patent.13 These three sources of
information are all contained within the patent and are all readily available to the
public.74 Any evidence outside of these three categories, including dictionaries,
treatises, and the opinions of experts and the inventors, is extrinsic to the patent, is
not readily available to the public, and therefore may only be used by the judge
65. Id. (citations omitted).
66. See id. at 979.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. From a sample of decisions written between April 1995 and June 1997, 33 cases were found
where the Federal Circuit rejected the lower courts' claim construction on appeal. See Robert C. Kahrl
& Elaine J. Herrmann, Claim Construction in the Post-Markman Era, 2-3 (Oct. 1997) (unpublished
presentation at AIPLA Convention) (on file at Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio).
70. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-83.
71. See id. at 979 (noting that expert testimony, including evidence of how those skilled in the art
would interpret the claims, may be used).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 980.
74. See id. at 979-80.
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performing claim construction to cure her own unfamiliarity with the language of
the patent."5 The judge may never use such extrinsic evidence to contradict the
meaning of the claim suggested by evidence higher in the hierarchy (the claims, the
specification, and the prosecution history) or to clarify ambiguity in the claim
terminology.76 Likewise, extrinsic evidence is due no deference from the court."
3. Impact of the Markman Decision
Of the numerous cases reversed based on claim construction since the Markman
decision, a majority of the cases were based on a failure of the district court judge
to properly weigh the evidence at trial.78 In other words, there seems to be an
inability of some district court judges to follow the Markman instructions.7 9
Perhaps this is because determining patent scope is inherently conceptual and
therefore not amenable to rigid rules of construction. ° It is also likely that the
court's instructions regarding extrinsic evidence are difficult to apply. Extrinsic
evidence can not be used to "clarify[] ambiguity in claim terminology,"8 but it can
be used "for the court's understanding of the patent."82 This is a fuzzy line at best,
and it is not difficult to sympathize with a judge's confusion. Furthermore, the
court's opinion that "there should be no 'ambiguity' in claim language to one of
ordinary skill in the art that would require resort to [extrinsic] evidence" is
misdirected.83 Ambiguity in claim language is precisely the cause of patent
infringement litigation. 4 If the line around the patentee's intellectual property was
75. See id. at 980-81, 986. "This evidence may be helpful to explain scientific principles, the
meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that appear in the patent and prosecution history." Id. at
980.
76. See id. at 983, 986.
77. See id. at 983.
This testimony about construction, however, amounts to no more than legal opinion-it is
precisely the process of construction that the court must undertake. Thus, as to these types of
opinions, the court has complete discretion to adopt the expert legal opinion as its own, to find
guidance from it, or to ignore it entirely, or even to exclude it.
Id. (citing Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
78. See Kahrl & Herrmann, supra note 69, at 4; supra text accompanying note 69.
79. See Kahrl & Herrmann, supra note 69, at 4.
80. See Christina Y. Lai, Comment, A Dysfunctional Formalism: How Modern Courts Are
Undermining the Doctrine of Equivalents, 44 UCLA L. REV. 2031, 2033 (1997) (criticizing the Hilton-
Davis decision for over-formalizing the analysis for the doctrine of equivalents); see also infra text
accompanying notes 153-60.
81. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 986; supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
82. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 981; supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
83. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 986; Kahrl & Herrmann, supra note 69, at 123-24.
84. See Kahrl & Herrmann, supra note 69, at 123-24.
crystal clear, presumably the nonwillful infringer would not have crossed it. 5 In
other words, Markman provides a framework in which to construe unambiguous
claims, while the real need is for a means of consistently construing ambiguous
claims because these are the claims at issue in litigation. 6 Perhaps if the court had
contemplated the actual interests and needs surrounding the problem instead of
simply relying the principle of fair notice, the ultimate goal, a clearer public record,
would now be the reality.
B. Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc.:87 What to Do
in Case of Ambiguity
Athletic Alternatives, handed down in the wake of the Markman decision,
attempted to pick up where Markman left off. Athletic Alternatives attempted to
answer the following question: What should ajudge do if, after following all of the
Markman instructions, the judge still finds ambiguity in the language of the
claims?88 The answer sounds like a coin toss; although all of the admissible
evidence on claim construction has been weighed by the judge, the judge can still
could decide either for the patentee or for the accused infringer.8 9 As fate, or rather
the justice system, would have it, the patentee lost again. 9' The principle of fair
notice prevailed.9'
The dispute in Athletic Alternatives involved tennis rackets,92 and each party
played its role predictably.93 The patentee, Athletic Alternatives, Inc. (Athletic
Alternatives), urged a broader definition of its patent claims. 94 The patentee argued
that the claims required only two offset distances between certain strings of the
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
88. See id. at 1581.
89. See id. at 1580-81.
90. See id. at 1581.
91. See id.
92. The history of the dispute is complex and unnecessary to an understanding of the holding. See
id. at 1574-77.
93. By this, the author refers to the typical arguments made by the patentee and the accused
infringer where the scope of the patent is at issue. See discussion accompanying supra notes 53-54.
94. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1578. The actual section of the claim in issue read as
follows:
[W]here at least said first ends of at least said first plurality of string segments are secured to
said frame at a distance di, where di is the perpendicular distance between the central plane and
the location on said frame to which the ith string end is secured, i designating the order of the
ith string end in the sequence of adjacent first string ends of said first plurality of string
segments, the distance di being alternately measured in opposite directions from said central
plane, and where said distance d, varies between minimum distances for the first and last string
ends in said sequence and a maximum distance for a string end between said first and last
string ends in said sequence.
Id. at 1577.
[Vol. 26: 89, 1998] Principle of Fair Notice
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
patented racket, a minimum and a maximum.95 On the other hand, the accused
infringer, Prince Manufacturing, Inc. (Prince), urged the narrower meaning-that the
claims required at least three offset distances: a minimum, a maximum, and one or
more intermediate values.96 If the court had adopted Prince's suggested construction
requiring three distances, Prince would have clearly prevailed because Prince's
accused product only had two offset distances. 97 If Athletic Alternative's patent
required three distances and Prince's product only had two, the jury would have
found that the two products were different and that Prince did not literally infringe
Athletic Alternative's patent.98 However, if the court adopted Athletic Alternative's
suggested broad construction requiring only two values, Prince clearly and literally
infringed. 99
After looking at the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution
history, as instructed in Markman," the court was still faced with two equally
plausible constructions of the claim language-two values or three values.'0 ' Rather
than flipping a coin, the court looked to the patentee's claim drafting burden set
forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112102 to resolve the dilemma. 10 3 Relying on the fair notice
purpose of this provision, the court created a cutting presumption against the
patentee and stated the following:"'s "Where there is an equal choice between a
broader and a narrower meaning of a claim .... we consider the notice function of
the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower meaning."' 05 Using its newest
tool of construction, the court gave Athletic Alternative's claim the narrower
meaning suggested by Prince and required three offset distances between strings.' 6
Using the narrow construction, a finding of literal infringement by the jury was
impossible.'0 7
95. See id. at 1578-79.
96. See id. at 1579.
97. See id. at 1577.
98. See id. at 1577, 1581.
99. See id. at 1578.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
101. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1581.
102. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (explaining how the claims define the scope of
the patentee's intellectual property, as required by statute).
103. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1581.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. The court affirmed the district court's finding of nonliteral infringement without sending it to
the jury. See id.
1. Impact of the Presumption Created in Athletic Alternatives
Instructing all courts to adopt a narrow meaning when faced with ambiguity
shrinks the patentee's reward and reduces her incentive to invent.'18 The Athletic
Alternatives presumption means that whenever the meaning of the language of the
claim cannot be discerned from the public record, the patentee's intellectual property
is shrunk to whatever size her opponent, the accused infringer, convinces the court
it ought to be.' 9 It is hard to imagine when the methodology prescribed in
Markman and Athletic Alternatives will ever work to the patentee's advantage." 0
In short, Markman provides no guidance for construing ambiguous claims, and
AthleticAlternatives says that if a claim is ambiguous, the accused infringer wins."'
Both Markman and Athletic Alternatives were decided based on the principle
of fair notice. Whenever a decision about the proper scope of a patent is made in
furtherance of the principle of fair notice, in essence, the decision maker is
indicating a need for added protection of the patentee's competitors. 2 In decisions
like Athletic Alternatives, the court is taking steps to ensure that competitors know
where the boundaries of patents lie so that they do not overstep them when investing
in similar research. However, it is questionable whether this protection is really
needed. Judge Learned Hand suggested in 1945 that competitors generally know
exactly where the boundaries of a patent lie, stating that "[i]t is impossible to
suppose that anyone who really wished to respect the patent would have any
difficulty in identifying what the claim covered." "i3 Today this may ring even truer
than it did then. ' Sophisticated corporations with sophisticated patent attorneys are
often the parties to patent infringement litigation." 5 By seeking the advice of an
experienced patent attorney, a corporation wishing to invest in technological
advancement can likely gain an adequate appraisal of its likelihood of
infringement."6 With this information, the corporation is able to make an informed
decision about whether the investment would be more wisely spent on a different
venture." 7 By encouraging corporations to make such informed decisions, wasteful
duplicative efforts are reduced and corporations are not dissuaded from investing
in technological research. Considerations such as these provide much more prudent
guidance for the future of patent law than simplistic reliance on the principle of fair
108. See Grover Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
109. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1581.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 55-107.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 55-107.
112. See Kahrl & Herrmann, supra note 69, at 97.
113. See Musher Found. v. Alba Trading Co., 150 F.2d 885, 889 (2d Cir. 1945).
114. See Kahrl & Herrmann, supra note 69, at 97.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
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notice.
C. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.: t" 8 Settling the
Debate Over the Doctrine of Equivalents in an Unsettling Way
1. The Debate Over the Doctrine of Equivalents
Literal infringement is found through the two step process which was clarified
in Markman. '9 First, the judge decides what technology the patent encompasses
through the process of claim construction. Second, thejury decides if the claim's
scope, as defined by the judge, includes the accused infringer's device.' 2' If the jury
determines that it does, then literal infringement is found. 2
The Supreme Court recognized many years ago that if literal infringement was
the patentee's only protection, the patent would soon become a "hollow and useless
thing." 23 The patentee's competitor could make a slight change to the patentee's
product which is ineffectual to its function or commercial utility and because the
competitor's device is not literally the same as the patentee's device, the competitor
would not be liable for literal infringement. 24 If literal infringement was the only
theory available to the patentee, the competitor would always be able to avoid
liability by making subtle and useless changes even though his device is the same
as the patentee's in substance. 2' Soon the patentee would be completely discour-
aged from disclosing his inventions, and instead he would hide his inventions in
secrecy, creating an atmosphere hostile to technological advancement.
126
118. 520U.S. 17(1997).
119. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S.
370 (1996).
120. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 56-82.
121. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 978; see also SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107,
1125 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that infringement is a question of fact).
122. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-79.
123. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). The Court
also stated the following:
Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement. To prohibit
no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating
substance to form. It would deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster
concealment rather than disclosure of inventions ....
Id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Nature and Function of Patent, supra note 24, at 288 (discussing how an economy with
a patent system is superior to an economy based on trade secrets).
The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to this threat. The doctrine of
equivalents allows a finding of infringement when the invention disclosed in the
plaintiff's patent is, in substance, the same as the accused device or process.12 For
example, in Athletic Alternatives, if the jury found that Prince's racket having two
offset distances between strings was, in substance, the same as Athletic Alterna-
tive's disclosed racket having three offset distances between strings as determined
by the judge, Prince would have been liable for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, even though the two rackets were not literally the same.128
How does this tie in with the discussion of the principle of fair notice?
Conceptually, the doctrine of equivalents blurs the line around the patentee's
intellectual property, and this is why proponents of the principle of fair notice
oppose it.12 9 Opponents of the doctrine of equivalents feel that it leaves the scope
of patents unclear, rendering it impossible for the public to know the boundaries of
the claimed intellectual property. 130 In turn, potential researchers are discouraged
from making improvements because of the fear of innocently infringing a patent.131
Achieving the proper balance between too literal interpretation of patents, which
provides little protection to the patentee, and too liberal interpretation of patents,
which defeats the fair notice purpose, has proved troublesome. 32 Either way,
technological advance is hindered. The effect of this debate has been inconsistent
application of the doctrine of equivalents from the time of its inception, 133 some time
shortly after the Patent Act of 1790, until very recently. 134 Warner-Jenkinson is the
most recent battle. Three significant holdings were handed down by the Supreme
Court in this case. 135 The facts of the case, the opinions of both the Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit, as well as the role of the principle of fair notice in the
decisions are discussed below.
136
2. Setting the Stage-The Facts of Hilton Davis
Both Hilton Davis Chemical (Hilton Davis) and Warner-Jenkinson Co.
(Warner-Jenkinson) were involved in the business of manufacturing dyes used in
127. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997); infra text
accompanying notes 149-60, 176-90.
128. See discussion supra Part m.B.
129. See Lai, supra note 80, at 2035.
130. See Petitioner's Brief, 1996 WL 172235, at *46-*49, Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (No. 95-728).
131. See Kuehnle, supra note 5, at 602-04.
132. See Schuler, supra note 36, at 465-67.
133. See id. at 455.
134. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
135. See discussion infra Parts l1.C.2, IHI.C.3, I.C.4.
136. See discussion infra Parts II.C.2, l.C.3, Ill.C.4.
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foods and cosmetics.' 37 Hilton Davis owned a patent for "ultrafiltration" which was
an efficient process for removing impurities from the dyes it manufactured.138 The
process involved filtering the dyes through a membrane at certain pressures and pH
levels.' 39 The Hilton Davis ultrafiltration patent claimed a process which worked
at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0.14 Soon after Hilton Davis's patent issued in 1985,
Warner-Jenkinson independently developed a similar process which operated at a
pH of 5.0.141 Warner-Jenkinson commercially used its process without knowledge
of Hilton Davis's patent until, in 1991, Hilton Davis learned of Warner-Jenkinson's
use of the ultrafiltration process and sued the company for infringement.
42
Because Hilton Davis's patent clearly claimed a process which worked at pH
levels between 6.0 and 9.0 and Warner-Jenkinson's process operated at a pH level
of 5.0, Hilton Davis conceded there was no literal infringement. 143 Therefore, the
issue was whether Warner-Jenkinson's process infringed Hilton Davis's patent
under the doctrine of equivalents.'" At the district court level, the jury found that
Warner-Jenkinson infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. '45 An injunction then
issued, permanently prohibiting Warner-Jenkinson from using an ultrafiltration
process below a pH level of 9.0 and a pressure of 500 p.s.i.g.146 Wamer-Jenkinson
appealed to the Federal Circuit where the en banc court affmned the finding of
nonliteral infringement. 147 On appeal once again, the Supreme Court reversed on
the basis of prosecution history estoppel and remanded the case. 48
3. The Federal Circuit Opinion
a. "Substantiality of differences" is the test for the Doctrine of
Equivalents
137. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
138. See id. at 21-22.
139. See id. at 22.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 23.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
148. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40-41.
Courts often state the doctrine of equivalents test in terms of the tripartite or the
function-way-result test. 149 Using this approach, "one device is an infringement of
another 'if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to obtain the same result'" as the patented device. 15° In Hilton Davis the Federal
Circuit explicitly held that while the function-way-result test often suffices to
establish or disestablish equivalency, the true test for equivalency is whether there
is a "substantiality of the differences between the claimed and accused products or
processes, assessed according to an objective standard.'' The court stated that the
function-way-result test is only a factor in the assessment of equivalency and other
factors may be relevant in the determination. '52 For example, the Federal Circuit
stated that "'[ain important factor'' that may be considered by the fact finder "'is
whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.' 
153
The insubstantial differences test for the doctrine of equivalents may be
consistent with the goals of achieving the ideal balance between the interests of the
patentee and that of public notice. Although the Federal Circuit's opinion in many
places indicates an inclination towards a formalized approach, the insubstantial
difference test is at least less formalized than the test ultimately mandated by the
Supreme Court, on appeal of the case, and therefore allows for a more conceptual
finding of equivalency. One commentator suggested that a more conceptual
approach, while seemingly difficult to apply, would in fact lead to the most
consistent application of the doctrine of equivalents. 5 4  A more consistent
application of the doctrine under a conceptual approach would lead to a more
defined scope of patents, furthering public notice without invariably robbing the
patentees of their reward.
55
A more conceptualized approach would lead to greater consistency in defining
patent scope by allowing consideration of factors recently given little weight, but
which make sense intuitively. Whether the patent in issue is a "pioneer" in its field
149. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518.
150. See Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (quoting Machine Co. v.
Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
151. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518.
152. See id. at 1519.
153. See id. (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)).
154. See Lai, supra note 80, at 2034.
155. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 3, at 848.
To restrict [a patentee] to the ... form disclosed ... would be a poor way to stimulate
invention, and particularly to encourage early disclosure. To demand such restriction is merely
to state a policy against broad protection for pioneer inventions, a policy both shortsighted and
unsound from the standpoint of promoting progress in the useful arts, the constitutional
purpose of the patent laws.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977)); Lai, supra note
80, at 2040-41.
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or merely an improvement in a crowded field is one such factor.15 6 Pioneer patents
are granted to the explorer who makes a breakthrough into previously unexplored
territory whereas improvement patents are given for "a secondary invention
consisting of a combination of old ingredients which produce new and useful
results."'57  Pioneer patents inherently involve a greater amount of risk and
innovation, and in return the patentee deserves a greater amount of protection.
158
Therefore, the first step using the conceptual approach to the doctrine of equivalents
is to determine whether the patent is a pioneer or an improvement. In making a
determination of equivalency, one can always be guided by the general principle that
the doctrine of equivalents should be applied more liberally for a pioneer patent than
it is for an improvement patent. Because a conceptual approach redirects the focus
away from mere debate over verbalism by a jury and towards factors readily
available and even intuitive to the public, approaching equivalency in this way
would provide more consistent and meaningful results. 5 9 As a result, the approach
minimizes the unpredictability the doctrine of equivalents currently causes, while
benefitting both the public and the patentee because of a clearer public record. 6°
b. The doctrine of equivalents is an issue offact
Prior to the Hilton Davis decision, the doctrine of equivalents was often referred
to as "equitable" because its purpose was to prevent the unfairness of depriving the
patentee of effective protection of her patent.161  However, the use of this label
sprung debate over whether equivalency should be determined by the judge or the
jury."' Looking to the origin of the doctrine, which was in the courts of law and not
equity, the court concluded that the term "equitable" should be given its broader
meaning and "general fairness" be considered; the court also firmly established that
the doctrine of equivalents is a matter of fact to be determined by the jury in a jury
trial and by the judge in a bench trial. 63
156. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 3, at 848; Lai, supra note 80, at 2040-41.
157. See Schuler, supra note 36, at 474 (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608).
158. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1532 (Newman, J., concurring); Merges & Nelson, supra note
3, at 848.
159. See Lai, supra note 80, at 2059.
160. See id.
161. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1521-22, 1525-26. The case most frequently credited as the origin of the doctrine
of equivalents is Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853). See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521; Kuehnle,
supra note 5, at 591-92.
c. The judge must always apply the doctrine of equivalents when there
is no literal infringement
The Federal Circuit had very little to say in reaching its third conclusion, that
the choice to apply the doctrine of equivalents is not discretionary with the judge
according to the circumstances of the case.' 64 Whenever literal infringement is not
found, the judge must automatically submit the issue of nonliteral infringement by
the doctrine of equivalents to the jury. 165 The court felt that this result necessarily
flowed from its decision that the doctrine of equivalents is to be determined by the
trier of fact. 16
6
Applying the principles set forth in its decision, the Federal Circuit found that
the district court properly sent the issue of nonliteral infringement to the jury with
appropriate instructions. 167 Because evidence presented at trial supported the jury's
finding of infringement, the Federal Circuit affirmed. 68
4. The Supreme Court Opinion
a. The validity of the doctrine of equivalents is confirmed
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Warner-Jenkinson began the battle by trying
to convince the Court that the doctrine of equivalents is no longer valid. 169 First,
Wamer-Jenkinson argued that the doctrine is inconsistent with the modem patent
statute because (1) it contradicts the requirement that the patent specifically claim
the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112, (2) it circumvents the reissue process set forth
in 35 U.S.C. § 251-52, and (3) it is inconsistent with the role of the PTO to set forth
the scope of patents through patent prosecution. 70  The Court responded by
cursorily pointing out that all of these arguments were made and rejected by the
Court in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co. '7' in 1950 and that the
minor changes to the Patent Act in 1952 did not provide a basis for overruling that
decision.
72
Warner-Jenkinson's second line of argument was that Congress implicitly
rejected the common law doctrine of equivalents by placing an equivalents provision
164. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
165. Seeid.
166. Seeid.
167. See id. at 1523.
168. See id. at 1524.
169. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25 (1997).
170. See id. at 25.
171. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
172. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 25.
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in 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, in the Patent Act of 1952.113 To this the Court
responded that § 112, paragraph 6 was a limited congressional action intended only
as a "targeted cure to a specific problem.0 17 4 In short, the Court flatly refused to rely
on what it called Warner-Jenkinson's "dubious negative inference" to obliterate the
long line of precedent that supports the doctrine of equivalents. 7 5 At least one thing
was made clear-the doctrine of equivalents lives.
b. The doctrine of equivalents must be applied to each individual
element of the claim, not to the claim as a whole
While the Court affirmed that the doctrine of equivalents lives, the question of
how deflated the doctrine would be by the end of the battle remained. 176 The
doctrine survived the Federal Circuit in fairly good health considering the rather
liberal insubstantial differences approach suggested by the court and the decision
that application of the doctrine is automatic upon a finding of nonliteral
infringement. 177 However, the doctrine did not escape the Supreme Court without
receiving a few damaging blows.
With respect to the Federal Circuit's holding that the correct test for the doctrine
of equivalents is whether there is an insubstantiality of differences between the
accused and the patented devices or process, superficially the Supreme Court
seemed rather ambivalent.
In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether
the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or process
contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented
invention? Different linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases,
173. See id. at 27. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 6 reads as follows:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing
a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and
such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof.
See id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (1952)). For a discussion of defining patent scope by function,
see generally Janicke, supra note 35.
174. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28.
175. See id. The Court also stated that "Congress can legislate the doctrine of equivalents out of
existence any time it chooses. The various policy arguments now made by both sides are thus best
addressed to Congress, not this Court." Id.
176. See Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for the Twenty-First Century: Maximize Patent
Strength andAvoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 499, 506 ("The Supreme Court's Hilton Davis decision confirms that the
doctrine of equivalents is very much alive, although just how well remains to be seen.").
177. See discussion supra Parts Ill.C.3.c, tH.C.4.a, 1fI.C.4.b.
depending on their particular facts .... [W]e see no purpose in going further and
micromanaging the Federal Circuit's particular word-choice for analyzing
equivalence... and we leave such refinement to that court's sound judgment ... .178
Although the words of the Court perhaps ring of ambivalency, the Court
changed the doctrine of equivalents by greatly formalizing the approach. 7 9
Reasoning that the doctrine of equivalents posed a threat to the public-notice
function of claims when broadly applied, the Court mandated that the "doctrine of
equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention
as a whole."'180 Each patent consists of one or more claims.' 8' A claim is usually a
very long sentence. However, inside each claim are several smaller and more
manageable elements. 182 Using the Supreme Court's approach, each element of the
patentee's claim must have an equivalent in the accused device or process in order
to make a finding of equivalency. 83 Using the old approach, the patented and
accused devices or processes only needed to be equivalent as a whole.8" While the
Supreme Court declined to address the Federal Circuit's finding that the doctrine of
equivalents is an issue of fact for the jury, it is suggested that the Court's silence
indicates agreement.'85 Therefore, the Court's new rule means that it is the jury who
will compare the words of each and every element of the patentee's claims to the
accused device.'86
The Supreme Court's adoption of the all-elements rule for the doctrine of
equivalents, is ironic when compared to the language used in Markman. In
Markman,I' 7 the Federal Circuit opined at the ineptitude of juries to construe the
language of the claims and the danger of forever binding patentees with false
misinterpretations if juries were to do so.'8 8  However, the Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision in Markman that claim
178. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40 (emphasis added).
179. See Lai, supra note 80, at 2060 ("T7he Supreme Court's test represents an undue formalization
that limits the application of the doctrine in a manner similar to the Federal Circuit's approach.").
180. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
181. See35U.S.C.§ 112 (1994).
182. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 35.
185. See id. at 38-39.
Because resolution of whether, or how much of, the application of the doctrine of equivalents
can be resolved by the court is not necessary for us to answer the question presented, we
decline to take it up. The Federal Circuit held that it was for the jury to decide whether the
accused process was equivalent to the claimed process. There was ample support in our prior
cases for that holding.
Id. at 38; see also Mueller, supra note 176, at 503, 509.
186. See Mueller, supra note 176, at 509.
187. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
188. Compare supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
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construction is exclusively a matter for the court.18 9 By formalizing the approach
to the doctrine of equivalents to the degree that it did, the Supreme Court in Warner-
Jenkinson subverted patentees to almost the exact dangers the Court purportedly
aimed to protect them from in Markman.190
c. A rebuttable presumption of prosecution history estoppel operates
against the patentee in the absence of an explanation for an amendment
Wisely reluctant to assume that the Court would abandon the doctrine of
equivalents completely, Warner-Jenkinson next asserted that prosecution history
estoppel estopped Hilton Davis from asserting that its invention was equivalent to
any process that operated below the lower pH limit of 6.0 in Hilton Davis's
claims.' 9' If Warner-Jenkinson could win this argument, it would win the case since
its process operated at a pH of 5.0.192 Prosecution history estoppel provides a limit
on the doctrine of equivalents.193 Generally, prosecution history estoppel prevents
the patentee from claiming that her invention is equivalent to intellectual property
that she gave up by making a narrowing amendment to her patent during
prosecution. 94 In this case, Hilton Davis amended its patent by placing a lower pH
level of 6.0 in its claims, but the reason for this amendment was unclear. 95 Warner-
Jenkinson argued that Hilton Davis's amendment should have the effect of
estopping Hilton Davis from claiming that its process was equivalent to any process
that operated at a pH below 6.0, regardless of Hilton Davis's reason for the
amendment. 96 This is the broadest interpretation of the rule. 97 However, stronger
precedent indicated that prosecution history estoppel would only bar a finding of
equivalents when the limiting amendment was made for the purpose of gaining
validity of the patent. 98 For example, if the amendment was made to distinguish the
patentee's invention from some other already patented invention, the patentee would
189. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
190. See id. at 388-89 (stating that "[t]he judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to
give proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury"). The Court also stated that "the importance
of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues of
construction to the court." See id. at 390.
191. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30 (1997).
192. See id. at 23, 30.
193. See Mueller, supra note 176, at 501; Lai, supra note 80, at 2057.
194. See Lai, supra note 80, at 2057.
195. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 32.
196. See id. at 30.
197. See Lai, supra note 80, at 2057.
198. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-32.
be estopped from claiming the disclaimed property. 99 But if the amendment was
made for a reason other than to gain validity of the patent, the doctrine of
equivalents could still be applied to the disclaimed property.2° If the Court adopted
the rule from precedent, the case would turn on whether Hilton Davis made the
amendment to avoid the prior art, in which case it would be estopped from asserting
that its process was equivalent to Warner-Jenkinson's process, or for some other
reason, in which Hilton Davis would still have a chance at proving equivalency.2 °1
The Court declined to adopt the broad interpretation of prosecution history
estoppel suggested by Warner-Jenkinson. 2  Precedent indicated that prosecution
history estoppel applied only when an amendment was made for a limited number
of reasons.203 Therefore, Hilton Davis could still win under the doctrine of
equivalents if its patent revealed a reason for the amendment other than to avoid the
prior art.2°4 Unfortunately for Hilton Davis, nothing in its patent indicated its reason
for the lower pH limit of 6.0.205 The following issue now faced the Court: What
should they do when nothing in the patent record reveals the reason for an
amendment?20 6 Once again, the Court relied on the public notice function of the
claims to resolve the dilemma and stated the following?07
Mindful that claims do indeed serve both a definitional and a notice function, we
think the better rule is to place the burden on the patent[-]holder to establish the
reason for an amendment .... The court then would decide whether that reason is
sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to application of the
doctrine of equivalents .... Where no explanation is established, however, the court
should presume that the [Patent and Trademark Office] had a substantial reason
related to patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment. In
those circumstances, prosecution history estoppel would bar the application of the
doctrine of equivalents as to that element. The presumption we have described...
gives proper deference to the role of claims in defining invention and providing
public notice, and to the primacy of the [Patent and Trademark Office] in ensuring
that the claims allowed cover only subject matter that is properly patentable .... 208
Because Hilton Davis's patent did not disclose a reason for its amendment, the
newly created presumption that the amendment was made to gain validity of the
patent took effect. 2°9 Prosecution history estoppel barred application of the doctrine
199. See id. at 30-3 1; Lai, supra note 80, at 2057.
200. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31-33.
201. See id. at 31-34.
202. See id. at 30-31.
203. See id. at 30-32.
204. See id. at 32-34.
205. See id. at 32.
206. See id. at 33.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added).
209. See id. at 33.
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of equivalents. 210 Because application of the doctrine of equivalents was improper,
the Court reversed and remanded the jury finding of nonliteral infringement. 21'
Warner-Jenkinson at last prevailed.212
d. Impact of the presumption of prosecution history estoppel
The Court's intent in creating the presumption of estoppel was to further the
principle of fair notice. 3 The fault in the Court's rationale is that the principle of
fair notice is secondary to the objective of promoting the useful arts. 214 The Court
left the patentee out of its equation when "giv[ing] proper deference to the role of
claims. '2M Furthermore, it is questionable whether the presumption actually serves
the stated end of preserving the public notice function of claims.216 The applicability
of the doctrine of equivalents and therefore, the scope of the patent, is made to teeter
on inquiry into the patent examiner's reasons for requiring an amendment.2 7
Because these intentions are not always readily apparent, a reliable and
economically beneficial public record is not created.'
The presumption created in Warner-Jenkinson also places a greater claim
drafting burden on the patentee. 219 Prior to the Markman and Warner-Jenkinson
decisions, the patentee's primary objective during patent prosecution was to gain
allowance of the claims from the patent examiner. 220 Therefore, patent applications
were written for a technically trained audience. 22' Now, however, the patent
prosecutor has a new audience. Markman established that the judge will determine
222the meaning of the claims by performing claim construction, and Warner-
Jenkinson established that the judge will also be the interpreter of the prosecution
history. 223  Warner-Jenkinson also made it clear that an omission from the
210. See id.
211. Seeid. at41.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 33.
214. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.; Barger, supra note 1, at 374.
215. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
216. See Lai, supra note 80, at 2058-59.
217. See discussion supra Part Il.C.4.c.
218. See Lai, supra note 80, at 2058-59.
219. See Mueller, supra note 176, at 501-02.
220. See id. at 502.
221. See id.
222. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967,978 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
223. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997).
prosecution history can work severely to the patentee's disadvantage.2 2 4 Coupling
these holdings together, the patentee's primary objective in patent prosecution is
now to write for the non-technically trained judge in order to create an instrument
which will effectively defend the patentee in an infringement litigation. 225 Adding
salt to the wound, there is also an indication that many federal judges disfavor patent
cases and resent the additional responsibilities that the recent Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit decisions have placed upon them.226 In sum, patent prosecutors must
now attempt to write meticulous yet reader-friendly patents in order to create an
instrument which will adequately protect the patentee.
227
IV. CONGRESS'S STANCE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR NOTICE AS
REFLECTED BY THE PATENT MARKING AND NOTICE STATUTE
Heretofore, the focus of this Comment has been the recent role of the principle
of fair notice in defining patent scope.228 The discussion now shifts to a related topic
-the role of fair notice in defining the rights of the patentee to enforce the patent.
Doing so reveals that the courts' increased reliance on the principle of fair notice is
inconsistent with Congress's intent to give limited protection against innocent
infringement.
229
The Patent Marking and Notice Statute230 is designed "to give patentees the
proper incentive to mark their products and thus place the world on notice of the
existence of the patent.' 23  Generally, the statute requires that a patentee who
produces her invention gives notice to the public of her invention by marking her
product with the word "patent" or "pat." together with the number of the patent.
23 2
The statute bars the patentee from receiving damages for the infringement that
occurs before the patentee complies with the statute either by marking or giving
actual notice to the infringer.2 33 Upon first glance, one would think that Congress
must have felt strongly about advancing the principle of fair notice. However, a
closer look reveals inconsistencies within the statute which indicate Congress's true
intent to limit the protections given against innocent infringement.
A. Inconsistencies in the Patent Marking and Notice Statute Which Indicate
224. See id.; Mueller, supra note 176, at 509.
225. See Mueller, supra note 176, at 503.
226. See id. (citing George E. Badenoch, Proceeding in the Gray Area After Markman, 2 No. 9
JbiELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1, 4 (June, 1996)).
227. See id. at 503-13.
228. See discussion supra Part EIl.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 234-295.
230. 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).
231. American Med. Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting
Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 806 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (E.D. La. 1992)).
232. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
233. See id.
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Congress's Intent to Limit the Protections Given Against Innocent
Infringement
1. Only Some Patentees Need Comply With the Statute
The first part of 35 U.S.C. § 287 reads as follows: Patentees, and persons
making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented article for
or under them, or importing any patented article into the United States .... 234
Generally speaking, a patent may be for a device or for a method.235 A patent for
a device, also referred to as an apparatus, encompasses tangible intellectual
property.236 Occasionally, this type of patent results in the production of the
patented device. Patentees who produce a patented device are required to mark the
product to receive damages for infringement, but patentees who never produce the
patented device or license someone else to do so need not comply. 237 A patent for
a method or process, on the other hand, encompasses a series of steps to accomplish
a change in something. 38 It is well established that items which embody only
method claims need not be marked.2 39 Furthermore, apparatus and method claims
sometimes overlap, making it difficult for patentees to determine when they are
required to mark7" 0 Adding confusion, the Federal Circuit held that where a patent
contains both method and apparatus claims, a patentee who has failed to mark the
products of the apparatus claims can collect damages for infringement of the method
claims, but only if the patentee does not assert infringement of any of the apparatus
claims in the complaint. 24' The patentee receives no recovery if the complaint
asserts both method and apparatus claims. 2 As one might suspect, this
interpretation of the statute creates anomalous results. 4 3 The unwary patentee who
asserts infringement of an apparatus claim may inadvertently forego damages for
infringement of the method claims. 2' Even if no confusion were created by the
234. Id.
235. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); Joel Voelzke, Patent Marking Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a):
Products, Processes, and the Deception of the Public, 5 FED. CIRcurr. B.J. 317, 345 n.7 (1995).
236. See Voelzke, supra note 235, at 345 n.7.
237. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
238. See Voelzke, supra note 235, at 345 n.7.
239. See id.
240. See id., at 325-28.
241. See Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Voelzke, supra,
note 235, at 331.
242. See Voelzke, supra note 235, at 331.
243. See id. at 317, 334.
244. See id. at 333-34.
distinction between device and method claims made in 35 U.S.C. § 287, there really
is no way to reconcile the differing treatment of patentees of device claims,
patentees of method claims, and patentees who chose not to produce their patented
inventions."'
2. Liability for Damages Is Not Dependent on the Infringer's Actual
Notice of the Patent
The next phrase of the statute reads as follows:
Patentees ... may give notice to the public ... either by fixing thereon the word
"patent" or the abbreviation "pat.," together with the number of the patent, or when,
from the character of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package
wherein one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.246
The statute creates the assumption that by marking, the patentee places the world on
notice of her patent.247 However, there is no stringent requirement that the marking
be in a place where it can be seen by the public.248 In one case, the court held that
marking the interior wall of the product was sufficient to satisfy the statute where
this was the only practical place for the mark. 249 If Congress wanted to give
expansive protection against innocent infringement, it could have written the statute
to require actual notice of infringement as a prerequisite to liability.250 But, because
Congress declined to expand the level of protection against innocent infringement,
it is indicative of Congress's intent to limit the protections against innocent
infringement.
3. Injunctive Relief Is Not Dependent on the Patentee's Compliance
The final section of the statute reads as follows:
In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in
any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be
recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. Filing of an action for
infringement shall constitute such notice.251
245. See id. at 328.
246. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994).
247. See Michael J. McKeon, The Patent Marking and Notice Statute: A Question of "Fact" or
"Act"?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 429, 435 (1996).
248. See Preston Moore & Jackie Nakamura, The United States Patent Marking and Notice Statute,
22 AIPLA Q.J. 85, 89-90 (1994) (giving examples of nonobvious markings).
249. See Shields-Jetco, Inc. v. Torti, 314 F. Supp. 1292, 1303-04 (D.R.I. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d
1061 (lst Cir. 1971).
250. See 35 U.S.C § 287(a).
251. Id.
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The language used here refers only to the award of monetary damages.252 The
court may issue an injunction upon a finding of infringement regardless of whether
the patentee complied with the marking statute. 3 Often enjoinder of the infringing
activities is the best relief for the patentee. Furthermore, the consequences of an
injunction may be severe for the infringer:
In many instances, an injunction is, in effect, a corporate death penalty, leading to
shutdown of facilities, layoff of employees, and a negative impact to consumers and
other third parties. The damages to a corporation due to an injunction can be severe,
even if the corporation wins on appeal.
254
Because an injunction is an equitable remedy awarded only in light of fairness, it is
unlikely that a court would issue a severe injunction against a defendant who
infringed without notice of the patent.2 5 However, in light of the possibility of
harsh consequences, the glaring omission of a limitation on injunctive relief from
the marking statute is suggestive of Congress's lenient stance on the issue of the
principle of fair notice.
B. Amsted Industries Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.:256 Toughening Up
the Patent Marking and Notice Statute
In Amsted, the Federal Circuit tightened up the patent marking and notice
statute in two ways. First, the court construed the language "for or under" to mean
that the patentee is responsible for ensuring that all licensees, even implicit
licensees, comply with the marking requirements. 7 Second, the court interpreted
the language "notified of the infringement" to mean that a patentee who has failed
to mark must make an affirmative act to notify the infringer of "the infringement"
and not merely of the patent's existence or ownership in order for damages to begin
accruing.258 Both of these interpretations place additional responsibility on the
patentee and are inconsistent with the intent of Congress to limit the protections
252. See id.
253. See Laurence H. Pretty & George C. Yu, Injunctive Relief in Patent Litigation, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1996, at 541, 561-62 (PL Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. G4-3982, 1996).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 545.
256. 24 F.3d 178 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
257. See id. at 185.
258. See id. at 186-87.
given against innocent infringement.
1. The Patentee Must Ensure that All Licensees, Including Implicit
Licensees, Comply With the Marking Statute
In Amsted, the jury found the defendant, Buckeye Steel Castings Company
(Buckeye), liable for willful infringement of Amsted's patent for a railroad car
underframe.259 Willful infringement occurs when the infringer knows of the
existence of the patent and ignores it or makes an uningenuous attempt to obtain an
opinion of noninfringement from an attorney.26° Willful infringement in essence is
deliberate infringement and is subject to greater damages than innocent infringement
which occurs without intent. 261 Because there was evidence to support the jury's
findings that the defendant, Buckeye, knew that the opinion of noninfringement
from its attorney was not based on a good faith belief, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the jury's finding of willful infringement.262
The court next addressed Amsted's cross-appeal of the district court's finding
that damages were limited by Amsted' s failure to comply with the marking statute,
35 U.S.C. § 287.263 The facts of the case are rather confusing. Amsted's patent was
for a railroad car underframe.264 Amsted only produced one component of the
patented underframe, the center plate. 265 Amsted sold the center plates to its
customers with instructions for incorporating the center plate into the patented
underframe, but did not mark the center plates.266 Amsted argued that because it
never produced the actual patented device, the complete underframe, nor explicitly
authorized any of its customers to produce the completed underframes, it was not
required to mark the component center plates.267 In other words, the patented device
was never produced "for or under" Amsted, and therefore, Amsted argued, it was
not required to comply with the statute.68In response to this argument, the court
turned to the principle of fair notice and stated: "In view of the purpose of section
287, 'to encourage the patentee to give notice to the public of the patent,"' there is
no reason why section 287 should only apply to express licensees and not to implied
licensees. '" 269 Accordingly, the court found that Amsted's sale of the component
259. Seeid. at 181.
260. See McKeon, supra note 247, at 437.
261. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994).
262. See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 182-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
263. See id. at 184-85.
264. See id. at 180. The patent in dispute is referred to as the '269 patent throughout the opinion.
See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 185.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting American Med. Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng'g. Corp., 6 F.3d
1523, 1538 (1993)).
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part center plates constituted an "implicit license" to its customers and was sufficient
to bring it within the "for or under" language of the statute. 270 Therefore, Amsted's
failure to mark the center plates constituted a failure to comply with the statute.27'
As a result, Amsted's damages were limited to the time after which it notified
Buckeye of the infringement.272
2. Impact of the Requirement that Implicit Licensees Be Marked
The court's decision to hold patentees liable for the actions of "implicit
licensees" is supported by neither precedent nor the principle of fair notice.273 Prior
to Amsted, no precedent existed which indicated that marking a component part of
the product is necessary to satisfy § 287.274 Furthermore, if Amsted had marked the
center plates that it sold, it was unlikely that many members of the public would
have seen the marking because the plates were only components of the underframe
of railroad cars. 275 Throughout its opinion, the Federal Circuit seems to have
interpreted the word "public" to mean "potential copyist.' 276  Making this
substitution helps make sense of the court's conclusion. One would expect a
potential copyist to check the underframe of a train to see if the center plate was
patented.277 Indeed, a potential copyist would be justified in relying on the absence
of the marking. 278 However, Congress drafted § 287 to protect against innocent
infringement, rather than potential copyists. 279  Conditioning the patentee's
protection upon the actions of the patentee's customers clearly goes beyond the
intended scope of § 287 and further reduces the incentives to create and disclose
ingenuity.
3. When the Patentee Does Not Mark, Damages Are Precluded Until
the Time that the Patentee Gives "Notice of Infringement"
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See Steven C. Sereboff, New Requirements in Patent Marking and Notice, 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 793, 798-99 (1994).
274. See id.
275. See id. at 799.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See McKeon, supra note 247, at 464.
Because Amsted failed to put the required mark, it was precluded from
receiving damages until the time that it gave notice to Buckeye of its
infringement.28 Therefore, notice pursuant to the marking statute was at issue.28'
Amsted argued that a letter sent to Buckeye in 1986 constituted such notice.282
Buckeye argued that the 1986 letter was not 'sufficient to satisfy the statute because
it did not actually accuse Buckeye of infringing and therefore notice did not occur
until 1989 when Amsted sent a second letter containing an actual accusation.283
Finding Dunlap v. Schofield284 to be controlling precedent, the Federal Circuit held
that notice pursuant to § 287 requires "the affirmative communication of a specific
charge of infringement by a specific accused product or device." 285 Notice of the
patent's existence or ownership is not sufficient.286 Because the 1986 letter
contained no "affirmative communication of a charge of infringement," the court
found that notice pursuant to the statute was not given until 1989.287 Thus,
Buckeye's argument prevailed.288
4. Impact of the "Affirmative Act" Rule
The interpretation of the notice requirement of § 287 requiring an "affirmative
act" is contrary to the intent of Congress and the basic tenet of patent law, which is
to encourage the promotion of technology. The affirmative act rule completely
280. See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 185 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
281. See id.
282. See id. at 185-86. The 1986 letter, in pertinent part, read as follows:
This is to advise you that Amsted ... has acquired a number of properties [from Dresser]
... including [the '269 patent] ....
It is our understanding that Dresser Industries actively sought to enforce its patent...
and those rights have been heretofore respected in the industry. AMSTED-ASF expects to
continue to enforce those rights which it has acquired and similarly expects our industry to
respect its patents.
Accordingly, you should acquaint yourself with the ['269 patent] and refrain from
supplying or offering to supply component parts which would infringe or contribute to the
infringement of the patent[ ]. You should not offer to supply items which are copies of or
designed to replace our LOW PROFILE center plate.
Id. at 186 (alterations in original).
283. See id.
284. 152 U.S. 244 (1894). A legitimate question exists as to whether Dunlap is binding precedent
mandating the decision in Amsted. See McKeon, supra note 247, at 446. Courts have repeatedly
misquoted Dunlap to require an "affirmative act." See id. However, the Dunlap court actually stated
that notice is an "affirmative fact, and is something to be done by [the patentee]." See Dunlap, 152
U.S. at 248 (emphasis added). The Dunlap court never addressed the specific issue in Amsted. See id.;
McKeon, supra note 247, at 446. It is possible that the Amsted court impermissibly extended the
holding in Dunlap as a result of the misquotation and unduly limited the notification requirement. See
McKeon, supra note 247, at 446.
285. SeeAmsted, 24 F.3d at 187.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 187-88.
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ignores the infringer's actions and knowledge.289 This allows an infringer to
blatantly appropriate the intellectual property of another while escaping liability.
290
No case illustrates this injustice of this implication better than Amsted itself.
Buckeye escaped damages for five years of willful infringement of Amsted's patent
in bad faith, resulting in a loss to Amsted of millions of dollars.29' Allowing this
type of misappropriation of intellectual property strips the patentee of the incentive
to create.292 Because the cost of imitating is less risky and costly than the cost of
creating new developments, the patentee's competitors can quickly undercut their
price.293 In effect, pirating of technology is encouraged.29 A patent system in
which acts of bad faith like Buckeye's are given free reign is stifling to
advancements in technology.295
V. SUMMARY
In each of the four cases discussed above, the Supreme Court or the Federal
Circuit attempted to ameliorate a problem by making a simplistic reliance on the
principle of fair notice but only succeeded in exacerbating it. Furthermore, failing
to look at all of the considerations involved almost invariably worked to the
detriment of the patentee in these cases. In Markman, the Federal Circuit set forth
a framework for claim construction which failed to address the need for consistent
and predictable construction of ambiguous claims.296 The result is a high rate of
reversal based on claim construction.297 InAthleticAlternatives, the court attempted
to address the lack of direction for construing ambiguous claims left by Markman
by creating a presumption that ambiguous claims will always be construed
narrowly. 29 The result is a consistent stripping of the patentee's intellectual
property rights and rewards for disclosure. 299 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme
Court adopted the element by element approach to the doctrine of equivalents,
which will likely result in the continued inconsistent application of the doctrine. 300
289. See McKeon, supra note 247, at 460.
290. See id. at 464-65.
291. See Amsted, 24 F.3d at 185; see also Mckeon, supra note 247, at 460.
292. See Mckeon, supra note 247, at 462.
293. See id. at 461-62.
294. See id. at 462.
295. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 52-86.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 68, 78-86.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 87-107.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 108-117.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 152-61.
Secondly, in Warner-Jenkinson, the Court placed a greater claim drafting burden on
the patentee by adopting the presumption of prosecution history estoppel. 30 ' Finally,
in Amsted, the Federal Circuit ignored congressional intent by making the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 287 more stringent than was intended. °2 The result of
the Amsted decision is to allow unparalleled misappropriation of patent rights
without redress for the patentee.30 3
VI. PRUDENT GUIDANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF PATENT LAW
The four cases discussed in this Comment make it clear that the Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit have been imprudent in relying on the principle of fair notice
to guide them in their recent decisions. The courts should instead seek to achieve
the balance of competing interests and aim for the greatest economic gain. These
competing interests are twofold. One interest is to preserve the incentive to create
and disclose which is accomplished by protecting the patentee's intellectualproperty
rights given by the patent. The second interest is the public benefit of free
competition, which can be achieved by providing clear patent scope. Providing
clear patent scope enables the public to discern which intellectual property is
protected by patent and which is available for development so that the threat of
innocent infringement does not inhibit improvement. However, when the courts
seek to define patent scope more clearly, they must take care that the rules they
create do not invariably define the patent to the disadvantage of the patentee and
reduce the incentive to create and disclose. The courts must also control the threat
of misappropriation by competitors. This threat discourages innovators from
disclosing their inventions, inhibiting free competition. Keeping the interest of both
the patentee and the public in mind is the best guidance for continued technological
and economic leadership in the United States.
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301. See supra text accompanying notes 176-227.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 256-88.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 289-95.
